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Abstract
Despite the historical and contemporary prevalence of charismatic
terrorist leaders, there has been very little empirical examination of the
relationship between charismatic forms of authority and the strategic
operation of terrorist groups. In response to this gap in knowledge, this
study seeks to investigate if charismatic authority has a real-world
impact on strategic choices and attack outcomes of terrorist groups.
Using a theoretical framework meant to help measure charisma in
terrorist organizations, this study quantitatively examines how differing
levels of the presence of charismatic authority contributes to the choice
in operational tactics (e.g., weapon and target choices) and the results of
attack outcomes (e.g., success rates, lethality) within a sample of thirty
international terrorist groups. In the concluding section, relevant
findings, policy recommendations, study limitations, and areas for future
research are discussed.
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Introduction 
In a recent Washington Post article about the leadership of the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the author reflected in length upon the levels of 
extreme devotion granted to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by the rank-and-file 
membership: 
 
“Baghdadi’s ability to inspire such intense support worries U.S. 
officials.  His fighters seemingly will go anywhere and do anything for 
the cause.  They combine a fanatical passion with an unusual degree of 
organization, technical skill and tactical planning… Baghdadi may be 
more skillful in the field than either of his mentors, Osama bin Laden 
or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq… The ISIS 
leader, in sum, is a clever, disciplined, violent and charismatic man–
with an eye for manipulating Muslim public opinion.”1 
 
From the way al-Baghdadi is described, it is evident that he is not a typical 
“run-of-the-mill” leader.  There is something special that differentiates him 
from other terrorists.  He possesses ineffable qualities that allow him to 
invoke the fanatical loyalty of his followers, who are willing to lay down their 
lives for his cause.  He embodies a potent blend of strong personality, 
fanaticism, and apparent piety that serves as a rallying cry for the creation of 
an Islamist state.  The implication is that al-Baghdadi’s charisma, and the 
charismatic qualities of leaders like him, present a significant challenge to 
Western efforts to combat Islamist terrorism. 
 
The academic literature on the relationship between charismatic authority 
and strategic organization in benevolent and violent groups is robust and 
multidisciplinary.2  Since the 1980s, scholars of management science have 
increasingly acknowledged that charisma is a key component in effective 
                                                 
1 David Ignatius, “A Terrorist with Gang-Leader Charisma,” The Washington Post 24 
(June, 2014), available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-
abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-the-terrorist-with-gang-leader-
charisma/2014/06/24/c4a88f2c-fbd2-11e3-8176-f2c941cf35f1_story.html. 
2 For example: Bass, Bernard M., Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations 
(New York: The Free Press, 1985); Burns, James MacGregor, Leadership (New York: 
Harper Perennial, 1978); Lorne L. Dawson, “Crises of Charismatic Legitimacy and Violent 
Behaviour in New Religious Movements,” in D.G. Bromley and J.G. Melton (eds.), Cults, 
Religion & Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 80-101; Rustow, 
Dankwart, Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (New York: George Brazilier, 
1970); Willner, Ann Ruth, The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Wilson, Bryan, The Noble Savages: The Primitive 
Origins of Charisma (California: Berkley, 1975). 
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business leadership and organizational success.3  Much of this recognition is 
due to the work of James Burns in his Pulitzer Prize winning book, 
Leadership, which identifies two ways in which leadership can manifest.4   
 
The first is transactional leadership, where managers “survey their 
subordinates’ needs and set goals for them on the basis of the effort they can 
rationally expect from their subordinates.”5  These types of leaders are 
commonplace, are primarily concerned with daily operations, and do not 
question larger organizational goals.  The second type of leadership is 
transformational, which is conceptually tied to charismatic authority.  In 
contrast to the day-to-day management involved in transactional leadership, 
transformational leaders “engage the full person of the follower” by arousing a 
higher level of need.6  In simpler terms, transformational leaders motivate 
their subordinates to become personally invested in the well-being and 
growth of their employer.  There are many colloquial examples of charismatic 
and transformational business leaders such as Lee Iaococa (Chrysler), 
Richard Branson (Virgin), and Steve Jobs (Apple), who seemingly single-
handedly turned around the fortunes of their companies.  The effects of 
transformational leadership on corporate success has been extensively tested, 
and findings suggest that charismatic business leaders have a real-world 
effect on the strategic and organizational behaviors of their employees.7 
 
The study of how charismatic leaders influence strategic dynamics in violent 
organizations has also been analysed empirically, particularly in the case of 
the minority of cults and new religious movements that turn towards violence.  
Scholars of new religious movements have noted that the escalation to 
violence in cultic movements is often tied to deviant social dynamics involving 
charismatic authority.8  A paradigmatic example is the case of the highly 
                                                 
3 See Bryman, Alan, Charisma and & Leadership in Organizations (London: Sage, 1992), 
91; J.A. Conger, “Theoretical Foundations of Charismatic Leadership,” in J.A. Conger and 
R.N. Kanungo (eds.), Charismatic Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organizational 
Effectiveness (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988), 23-36. 
4 Burns, Leadership. 
5 Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations, 13. 
6 Ibid., 14. 
7 See Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations; Bass, Bernard and Riggio, 
Ronald, Transformational Leadership (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2006); Jane Howell 
and Bruce Avolio, “Transformational Leadership, Transactional Leadership, Locus of 
Control, and Support for Innovation: Key Predictors of Consolidated-Business-Unit 
Performance,” Journal of Applied Psychology 78: 6 (1993), 891-902. 
8 For example: Dawson, “Crises of Charismatic Legitimacy”; Thomas Robbins, “Sources of 
Volatility in Religious Movements,” in D.G. Bromley and J.G. Melton (eds.), Cults, 
Religion & Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57-79; Wessinger, 
Catherine, How the Millennium Comes Violently: From Jonestown to Heaven’s Gate 
(New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000). 
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charismatic Shoko Asahara and his adherents in Aum Shinrykyo.  In response 
to his waning authority and pressures to fulfill certain apocalyptical 
prophecies, Asahara masterminded the Tokyo subway sarin gas attacks in 
1995 that killed thirteen individuals and injured thousands.9  The influence of 
charismatic leaders on strategic dynamics has also been examined to a lesser 
degree in the context of radical and terrorist groups.  In a survey administered 
to 650 religious Muslim men who participated in a “Jerusalem Day” protest 
march in 2002, Ayla Schbley and Clark McCauley noted a significant 
relationship between charismatic authority and respondents’ willingness to 
use CBRN (chemical, radiological, biological, and nuclear) weapons.10  
Researchers interested in malevolent creativity within terrorist groups have 
also recognized the importance of charismatic leaders and entrepreneurs to 
the creation of innovative strategic behavior.11  This suggests that, much like 
in the case of benevolent organizations, diverse factors involving charismatic 
authority affect strategic behaviors of violent organizations and their 
members. 
 
There are many historical and contemporary instances of charismatic 
terrorist leaders who have risen to lead violent political action against 
perceived injustices.  Obvious examples include Shoko Asahara of Aum 
Shinrykyo, Abdullah Ocalan of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, Abimael 
Guzman of the Shining Path, Vellupillai Parabakharan of the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Andreas Baader of the Red Army Faction, and Osama 
Bin Laden of al-Qaida.  Yet, despite the prevalence of charismatic terrorist 
leaders, there has been relatively little scholarly research on how charisma 
influences important social and strategic dynamics within terrorist groups.12  
This gap in knowledge persists despite widespread acknowledgement by 
                                                 
9 See Lifton, Robert, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic 
Violence, and the New Global Terrorism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999); Reader, 
Ian, Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo (Surrey: 
Curzon Press, 2000). 
10 Ayla Schbley and Clark McCauley, “Political, Religious, and Psychological 
Characteristics of Muslim Protest Marchers in Eight European cities: Jerusalem Day 
2002,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17 (2005): 563. 
11 Paul Gill, John Horgan, Samuel Hunter, and Lily Cushenbery, “Malevolent Creativity in 
Terrorist Organizations,” The Journal of Creative Behavior 47: 2 (2013): 125-151; Maria 
Rasmussen and Mohammed Hafez, “Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: 
Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators,” The Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
at the Naval Postgraduate School, Report ASCO 2010-019 (August 2010), available at: 
http://www.nps.edu/academics/centers/ccc/research/2010%20019%20terrorist%20in
novations%20in%20wme.pdf.  
12 See David C. Hofmann and Lorne L. Dawson, “The Neglected Role of Charismatic 
Authority in the Operation of Terrorist groups and the Process of Radicalization,” Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism 37: 4 (2014): 349, 355; Ingram, Haroro, The Charismatic 
Leadership Phenomenon in Radical and Militant Islamism (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 1-4. 
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scholars of the importance of charismatic authority in the recruitment and 
radicalization of terrorist operatives. For example: 
 
“In many of the reviewed studies, evidence seems to indicate the 
importance of the influence of a peer group or significant other - a 
charismatic leader, a family member or a trusted peer - as a key in 
initiating and driving the radicalization process. Many indicate the 
increasing importance of the peer group leader with regard to outreach 
and recruitment, not least because overt and top-down recruitment 
has become more difficult in Europe due to countermeasures of 
authorities.”13 
 
Scholars also acknowledge that charismatic authority plays an important role 
in how some terrorist groups operate, strategize, and execute successful 
attacks: 
 
“In order for a group of people with a grievance to turn into a terrorist 
cell, they need an effective leader. This leadership comes in two forms: 
operational and charismatic. These two qualities are sometimes found 
in separate people in a group and sometimes in one person. 
Operational and charismatic leadership are vital in providing training, 
motivation, discipline and group cohesiveness. Leadership within the 
group is the determinant in terrorist “success”.”14  
                                                 
13 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What we Know and What we 
do not Know,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33 (2010): 810; See also: Crelinsten, 
Ronald, Counterterrorism (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 36-37; Lorne L. Dawson, “The 
Study of New Religious Movements and the Radicalization of Home-Grown Terrorists: 
Opening a Dialogue,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22 (2010): 9; Hamm, Mark, The 
Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat (New York: 
New York University Press, 2013); Dipak Gupta, “Exploring Roots of Terrorism,” in Tore 
Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 19; Mirra Noor Milla, Faturochman Ancok, and Djamaludin Ancok, 
“The Impact of Leader-Follower Interactions on the Radicalisation of Terrorists: A Case 
Study of the Bali Bombers,” Asian Journal of Social Psychology 16 (2013): 92-100; Petter 
Nesser, “Joining Jihadi Terrorism Cells in Europe: Exploring Motivations, Aspects of 
Recruitment and Radicalization,” in Magnus Ranstorp (ed.), Understanding Violent 
Radicalization: Terrorist and Jihadi Movements in Europe, (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 96-97; Vertigans, Stephen, The Sociology of Terrorism: People, Places and 
Processes (London: Routledge, 2011), 106-107. 
14 Michael Silber and Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” 
(New York: New York Police Department, 2007): 50, available at: 
http://www.readbag.com/nypdshield-public-sitefiles-documents-nypd-report-
radicalization-in-the-west; See also:  Ersel Aydinli, “From Finances to Transnational 
Mobility: Searching for the Global Jihadists’ Achilles Heel,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 18 (2006): 307; Or Honig, “Explaining Israel’s Misuse of Strategic 
Assassinations,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (2007): 571; Fathali Moghaddam, “A 
Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American Psychologist 60 (2005): 
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The common refrain in the terrorism literature is that leaders, particularly 
charismatic ones, are important to social processes involved in the formation, 
operation, and demise of their groups.  Despite this recognition, a number of 
pressing questions remain unanswered: How exactly do charismatic terrorist 
leaders inspire such fanatical levels of devotion from their followers?  Are 
there strategic differences between charismatically-led and other types of 
terrorist groups?  Are charismatically-led terrorist groups more prone to 
certain types of behaviors than other types of terrorist organizations?  Given 
the worrisome ability of certain terrorist leaders like al-Baghdadi to inspire 
intense devotion among their followers, it is clear that further scholarly 
analysis is needed if we are to understand how to properly combat this genre 
of Islamist fundamentalism. 
 
To date, the terrorism literature that mentions charismatic authority is largely 
speculative, and there is little empirical research backing up the majority of 
statements made by scholars about the charismatic nature of certain terrorist 
leaders.15  Therefore, the objective of this study is to begin addressing this gap 
in knowledge by quantitatively examining how differing levels of charismatic 
authority may influence operational tactics and attack outcomes within 
terrorist groups.  It builds directly from the concluding remarks made by 
David Hofmann and Lorne Dawson that call for more robust empirical 
analyses of charismatic terrorist leadership.16  At this early stage, this study 
does not seek to authoritatively test specific claims made by terrorism 
scholars about charismatic terrorist leaders.  Rather, it purposefully takes a 
broad inductive approach.  As a result, no specific predictions or hypotheses 
are made in order to allow for the post hoc application of findings to help 
strengthen or discredit what we believe to know about the relationship 
between charismatic terrorist leadership and the strategic operation and 
outcomes of terrorist attacks. 
 
This article begins with a brief overview of the theoretical background on 
charismatic authority, although space and scope constraints limit an in-depth 
                                                 
162; Nesser, “Joining Jihadi Terrorism Cells in Europe,” 98; Jerrold Post, “When Hatred 
is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-Cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism,” Political 
Psychology 26 (2005): 620; Richardson, Louise, What Terrorists Want: Understanding 
the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006), 45. 
15 See David C. Hofmann, “Quantifying and Qualifying Charisma: A Theoretical 
Framework for Measuring the Presence of Charismatic Authority in Terrorist Groups,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38 (2015): 710-733, available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1048100#.VZGu8UbQM
QQ; Hofmann and Dawson, “The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority.” 
16 See Hofmann and Dawson, “The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority,” 362-363. 
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explanation.17  This is then followed by a presentation of the data, methods, 
and measures used during analysis.  Results from frequency, bivariate, and 
multivariate models that examine the relationship between varying levels of 
the presence of charismatic authority, operational tactics (e.g., weapon choice, 
target choices), and the outcome of terrorist attacks (e.g., success rates, 
lethality, number of wounded) are then presented.  The article finally 
concludes with a discussion of results, policy recommendations, study 
limitations, and areas for future research. 
 
What is Charismatic Authority? 
The theoretical basis for charismatic authority is derived primarily from Max 
Weber’s discussion of legitimate domination.18  In his analysis of how and 
why people submit to the dominion of others, Weber identifies three “ideal-
types”19 of authority: 1) traditional; 2) rational-legal; and 3) charismatic.  
Traditional authority is the acceptance of an individual’s or office-holder’s 
power that is based upon long-standing socio-cultural norms, customs, or 
traditions (e.g., a monarch, a tribal chieftain).  Rational-legal authority 
demands obedience based upon the recognized power that is intrinsically 
invested in an office or position (e.g., law enforcement and elected officials).  
Traditional and rational-legal forms of authority are typically stable, and are 
focused on the routine, day-to-day governance over a group, organization, or 
country.  In other words, these forms of authority base their legitimacy on 
well-entrenched hierarchical and bureaucratic social structures.  However, 
when in its “ideal-typical” form, charismatic authority is established in direct 
opposition to traditional and rational-legal forms of domination.  Rather than 
deriving their authority from long-standing traditions or bureaucratized 
offices, charismatic leaders demand obedience from their followers based 
upon the recognition of some extraordinary, supernatural, or divine quality.  
As Weber explains, it is this “extraordinariness” that differentiates 
                                                 
17 For a more comprehensive overview of charismatic authority in the context of terrorism 
studies, consult Hofmann and Dawson, “The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority,” 
350-355. 
18 Max Weber, Economy and Society, G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds.), (Berkley: University 
of California Press, 1978), 212-245. 
19 An “ideal-type” (also known as “pure” type) is a sociological concept developed by 
Weber. Ideal-types are primarily used to by social scientists to compare and analyze 
abstract social scientific concepts. They consist of a number of characteristics used to 
describe a social phenomenon which, will never manifest in a “pure” sense in reality. For 
example, a leader will never actually display all the characteristics of a “pure” charismatic 
leader. Rather, he/she will display varying elements, traits, and relationships that qualify 
them as “charismatic” when using the ideal-typical definition of a charismatic leader as a 
point of reference.  
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charismatic leaders from their traditional and rational-legal counterparts: 
 
“[Charisma is] a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue 
of which he is set apart from ordinary men, and treated as endowed 
with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities.  These are such as are not accessible to the 
ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, 
and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a 
leader.”20 
 
This perceived “extraordinariness” can vary greatly.21  People may submit to a 
charismatic leader based upon perceptions of something as simple as superior 
oratorical skills, or followers may fervently believe in the god-like nature of 
the charismatic leader.  Regardless of how it manifests, if a truly charismatic 
leader manages to gather a following, perceptions of the leader’s exceptional 
nature can move and inspire adherents to surrender themselves completely to 
the fulfillment of the leader’s stated goals.22  As Dawson notes, there are other 
social, strategic, and structural conditions that need to be met in order for a 
charismatic leader to be successful.23  But, if established, the bond between 
charismatic leaders and their followers is truly unique: “In its “pure form” 
charismatic authority involves a degree of commitment on the part of the 
disciples that has no parallel in [traditional and rational-legal] types of 
domination.”24  It is this special bond of love and loyalty formed between a 
charismatic leader and his or her flock that serves as a catalyst for the 
commission of both remarkable and terrible acts. 
 
Scholars note that charismatic authority tends to manifest primarily during 
times of socio-cultural, political, and religious turmoil.25  If traditional and 
                                                 
20 Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, S.N. Eisenstadt (ed.), (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 48. 
21 John Gordon Melton, “When Prophets Die: The Succession Crisis in New Religions,” in 
When Prophets Die: The Postcharismatic Fate of New Religious Movements, Timothy 
Miller (ed.), (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 2.  
22 Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1977), 300. 
23 Lorne L. Dawson, “Charismatic Leadership in Millennial Movements,” in Catherine 
Wessinger (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Millennialism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 121-123. 
24 Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, 300. 
25 Dawson, “Charismatic Leadership in Millennial Movements,” 119-124; William H. 
Friedland, “For a Sociological Concept of Charisma,” Social Forces 42: 1 (1964): 22-24; 
Ingram, The Charismatic Leadership Phenomenon, 20-21; Douglas Madsen and Peter 
Snow, The Charismatic Bond: Political Behavior in Time of Crisis (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), 14-23; Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, 19; Wilson, 
The Noble Savages, 26-31.  
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rational-legal forms of authority are seen as incapable of resolving the crisis, 
people can become “charisma hungry” in search of a resolution.26  There are 
numerous historical examples of this phenomenon.  Charismatic leaders like 
Adolf Hitler, Mohandas Gandhi, Winston Churchill, Joan of Arc, and Martin 
Luther King Jr. almost always stand at the heart of social and political 
movements that challenge conventional norms and drastically alter the social 
landscape, for good or for ill.  Since the basis for a charismatic leader’s 
authority lies in the perception of the extraordinary qualities of an individual, 
they are not hampered by the rules and traditions which govern the more 
stable forms of authority.  As a result, the power that they wield can be 
virtually unrestricted in its scope.27  In this sense, charismatic authority is 
both anti-institutional and a force for change.  Given the tumultuous, change-
oriented nature of charismatic authority, it is unsurprising that terrorism is 
fertile soil for the emergence of charismatic leaders who are focused on social 
and political change through the use of coercive violence.28 
 
As a final note, the type of relationship formed between charismatic leaders 
and their followers is best conceived as a mutually-established dyadic bond: 
 
“The general consensus among scholars is that the focal point of 
research should be the relationship between the charismatic leader 
and his or her followers and not the individual psychological qualities 
of the leaders.  This relationship, also known as “the charismatic 
bond,” is socially constructed through a complex process of 
negotiation.  It rests on an exchange of mutual needs, where the 
charismatic leader is granted authority by the followers in return for 
recognition, affection, and reinforcement of worth (emphasis 
original).”29 
 
In simpler terms, the charismatic relationship should not be understood as 
the unilateral imposition of the leader’s strong will upon his or her mindless 
followers.  Rather, both leaders and followers are active participants in the 
formation of the charismatic bond, and both parties gain something from the 
                                                 
26 Dawson, “Charismatic Leadership in Millennial Movements,” 121-123; Korany, Baghat, 
Social Change, Charisma and International Behaviour: Toward a theory of Policy-
Making in the Third World (Geneve: Institute Universitaire de Hautes Etudes 
Internationales, 1976). 
27 Eileen Barker, “Charismatization: The Social Production of ‘an Ethos Propitious to the 
Mobilisation of Sentiments,” in E. Barker, J.A. Beckford and K. Dobbelaere (eds.), 
Secularization, Rationalism and Sectarianism: Essays in Honor of Bryan R. Wilson 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 182-183. 
28 Rasmussen and Hafez, “Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect,” 84. 
29 Hofmann and Dawson, “The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority,” 351. 
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relationship. As a result, there is scholarly agreement that the focal point of 
research on charismatic authority should be on the formation and 
maintenance of this special type of relational bond.30 
 
Data and Methods 
Research Objective and Focus 
The primary objective of this study is the quantitative examination of the 
relationship between varying levels of the presence of charismatic authority 
(PCA) among a sample of thirty international terrorist groups (n = 30) and 
their strategic choices (e.g., target preferences, attack methods).  It also 
attempts to determine whether groups with higher levels of the PCA are likely 
to be more successful and/or more destructive (reflected by lethality rates and 
number of wounded victims/perpetrators).  This study employs a predictor 
variable that was coded using a theoretical framework (the “PCA indicators”) 
designed for measuring the presence of charismatic authority within and 
across terrorist groups.31  The predictor variable was then used to test the 
relationship between the PCA scores of each group in the sample with a 
number of outcome variables that reflect a range of strategic choices and 
attack outcomes. 
 
The current study focuses exclusively on non-state actors, rather than 
exploring the presence of charismatic authority within the contexts of either 
insurgent or state terrorism.  The decision to exclude state terrorism from the 
analysis was due to the nature of the authority relationships examined in this 
study.  Charismatic authority within small and clandestine groups is based on 
according power to an individual who actively challenges and seeks to replace 
established social norms and governance, while “charismatic” political leaders 
typically operate within the bureaucratized structure of traditional or 
rational-legal authority.  In other words, the charisma attributed to “likeable” 
political leaders is superficial and is not the same sort of intense and personal 
bond formed between a “pure” charismatic leader and his or her followers.32  
There are very few politicians who are venerated by followers in the same 
manner as highly charismatic terrorist leaders.  This does not mean that the 
                                                 
30 Barker, “Charismatization”; Madsen and Snow, The Charismatic Bond; Roy Wallis, 
“Charisma and Explanation,” in Secularization, Rationalism and Sectarianism: Essays 
in Honor of Bryan R. Wilson, eds. E. Barker, J.A. Beckford and K. Dobbelaere (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), 167-179; Willner, The Spellbinders. 
 
31 Hofmann, “Quantifying and Qualifying Charisma.” 
32 See Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, 298-307; Hofmann and Dawson, 
“The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority,” 349. 
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PCA indicators cannot be adapted to account for certain extreme types of 
charismatic political leaders and dictators who perpetrate or support state 
terrorism (e.g., Ayotollah Khomeni, Kim Jong Un, Muammar Gaddafi).  But 
the theoretical framework presented in this study focuses on the “ideal-
typical” charismatic relationship that is antithetical to traditional and 
rational-legal forms of authority, and is therefore better suited for analyzing 
non-state terrorist groups. 
 
Dataset 
The data were taken from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is 
maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START).33  The GTD uses publically available and 
unclassified data to record various characteristics of incidents of terrorist 
violence from events occurring between 1970 and 2011.  Data sources include 
media articles, electronic news archives, existing datasets, books, journals, 
and legal documents.  This limits the incidents within the study sample to 
successfully executed attacks that have been recorded by START and whose 
details are known to the general public. 
 
Sample Selection and Data Inclusion 
The focus on contrasting a group level variable (the PCA within terrorist 
groups) with incident-based data led to the creation of a modified dataset 
with hierarchical data (also known as nested or clustered data) comprising of 
two distinct levels.  The first level includes the various descriptive variables 
for each incident (e.g., attack type, number of perpetrators, number of 
victims), which are nested in the second level of data, comprised of the thirty 
terrorist groups that make up the study sample.  The hierarchical nature of 
the data necessitated the use of survey-based variance estimates for models at 
the bivariate level, and the use of random intercept multi-level models at the 
multivariate level to account for the non-independence of cases. 
 
For the selection of groups, each distinct terrorist organization listed in the 
GTD was given a sequential numerical value.  A random number generator 
was then used to select groups for the sample.  The viability of each group for 
inclusion in the final sample was assessed during the coding process.  Those 
with insufficient available information (e.g., language issues, 
security/publication bans) to allow for comprehensive coding were discarded.  
                                                 
33 START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. 
Global Terrorism Database [Datafile], 2012, available at: http://start.umd.edu/gtd.  
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The groups included in the final sample are listed in Table 1, in descending 
order of PCA scores.  
 
Table 1: List of Groups Included in Final Sample in Rank Order from Highest 
to Lowest PCA Score  
 
Group Name 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
Taliban 
Shining Path  
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) 
Hizballah 
Jewish Defense League (JDL) 
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) 
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) 
Baader-Meinhof Group 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
Red Army Faction (RAF) 
al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) 
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) 
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) 
New People’s Army 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) 
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) 
Army of God 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(FMLN) 
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) 
Weather Underground 
Red Brigades 
Action Directe  
 
In order to avoid blindly blending multiple off-shoot groups into the larger 
organizations from which they were created, attack incidents in the GTD 
executed by a splinter or sub-group were excluded from the final dataset (e.g., 
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when an alternate group is listed).   This was done in order to avoid the 
conflation of terrorist organizations with similar ideologies, goals, and 
methods, but whose levels of the PCA may have differed greatly.  This limits 
the data somewhat, because it is impossible to correctly identify the “true” 
perpetrators of terrorist incidents one-hundred percent of the time.  Findings 
should be interpreted with this limitation in mind. 
 
The incident data nested within the thirty terrorist groups chosen for analysis 
were also subjected to three inclusion criteria: 1) the selected incident must 
not have been in doubt as to whether it was a terrorist act (using the doubt 
terrorism proper variable when data were available); 2) the selected incident 
was perpetrated by an actual known terrorist entity, as opposed to suspected 
umbrella affiliations (Kashmiri separatists, Jewish radicals, anti-abortion 
activists etc.); and 3) the selected incident conformed to all three GTD 
definitions of terrorism.  Incidents that did not conform to these three criteria 
were excluded.  The GTD’s three criteria for the definition of terrorism are as 
follows:    
 
 The incident must be intentional 
 The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence 
 The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors34 
 
Table 2: Coding Scheme for PCA Scores  
 
Code Qualitative Statement 
 
0 
Never the case  
(0% of the time) 
 
1 
Rarely the case  
(<25% of the time) 
 
2 
Sometimes the case  
(Between 25-49% of the 
time) 
 
3 
Often the case 
(Between 50-74% of the 
time) 
 
4 
Very often the case 
(Between 75-99% of the 
time) 
 
5 
Always the case 
(100% of the time) 
 
                                                 
34 START, “Global Terrorism Database Codebook,” 6. 
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As a result, the modified dataset was limited to incidents perpetrated by 
known non-state actors who committed clearly identifiable acts of terrorism, 
as per the GTD’s definition.  After application of the inclusion/exclusion 
criteria, a total of 18,172 terrorist incidents were included in the final 
modified dataset, nested within thirty terrorist groups.  
 
Coding the Predictor Variable 
The GTD is a critical incident database of terrorist attacks that collects 
information on variables such as methods of attack, fatalities, property 
damage, tactics used, etc.  The data are meant to provide a broad overview of 
terrorist activities and methods, but reveal little about the social realities 
within the groups themselves, such as ideology, motivations, and 
relationships.  Therefore, no existing variable within the GTD can be used to 
gauge the presence of charismatic authority within the groups listed in the 
database.  As a result, the construction of a variable capable of assessing the 
presence of charismatic authority within terrorist groups was required.  This 
was done by using a list of fourteen indicators (the “PCA indicators”) meant to 
assist in the qualitative and/or quantitative operationalization of charismatic 
authority in the context of terrorist groups.  The PCA indicators are based on 
Weber’s theories of legitimate domination, as well as empirical insights from 
charismatic authority in new religious movements.  Full descriptions of each 
indicator are available in the article outlining the theoretical framework.35  
The list of indicators are as follows: 
 
1. Are attributions of power to the leader based on the followers’ 
perception of the leader’s supernatural or superhuman and/or 
exceptional powers and qualities? 
2. Is the authority of the leader interpreted in terms of ingrained and 
traditional conceptions of charismatic authority in the broader society 
and culture? 
3. Is authority attributed to the leader on the basis of the perception that 
there is an impending or current crisis, one associated with the 
bankruptcy of existing forms of traditional and/or rational-legal forms 
of authority? 
4. Is the authority attributed to the leader associated with any physical 
impairment or suffering which is viewed positively by the followers? 
                                                 
35 See Hofmann, “Quantifying and Qualifying Charisma,” 715-721. 
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5. Does the leader legitimate their authority through reference to a higher 
source of authority, either divine or some other transcendent source 
(i.e., a supreme ideology)? 
6. Are grandiose and exaggerated claims made about the nature and 
scope of the leader’s authority and importance? 
7. Are new members socialized into recognizing the special powers and 
authority of the leader? 
8. Does the leader figure prominently in the folklore of the group and the 
representation of its ‘story’?  
9. Are organizational decisions highly centralized and reliant on the will 
of the leader? 
10. Is the leader intolerant of alternative sources of power and authority, 
both internal and external to the group?  
11. Does the leader introduce sudden and /or seemingly arbitrary changes 
in the practices and policies of the group? 
12. Do followers readily accept these sudden and/or seemingly arbitrary 
changes in the practices and policies of the group? 
13. Is the delegation of authority highly centralized and reliant on the will 
of the leader? 
14. Does the legitimacy of subordinate leaders in the group depend on the 
nature of their personal relationship with the leader? 
 
On a group-to-group basis, coding involved assigning a value to each of the 
PCA indicators using a scale ranging between zero and five.  Each number on 
the scale corresponds with a qualitative descriptor.  The coding scheme used 
is available in Table 2.  Using the scale as a guide, the coder made an 
informed choice based on available sources of information before assigning a 
value for each indicator.  A coding table was constructed for each group, 
which allowed for annotation and organization of material for each indicator.  
Triangulation methods were used as much as possible to ensure that the data 
used for analysis was reliable.36  Information on groups were gleaned from 
case studies, peer-reviewed articles, scholarly books, historical accounts, 
online videos, biographies, as well as media and journalistic accounts taken 
from the Factiva and Lexis-Nexis databases.  Each group was meticulously 
researched prior to actual coding.  In cases where groups had undefined or 
unclear leadership (e.g., multiple leaders, spiritual vs. operational leaders), 
the coder made an informed judgement call and the leader most involved in 
                                                 
36 See Todd Jick, “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 24: 4 (1979): 602-611; Wendy Olsen, “Triangulation in 
Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods Can be Really Mixed,” in M. 
Holborn (ed.), Developments in Sociology (Ormskirk UK: Causeway Press, 2004). 
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the creation and shaping of the group’s ideology was chosen for analysis.  If 
multiple leaders were responsible for creating and shaping the group’s 
ideology, they were all considered as a single entity for the purposes of coding.  
Coding for the current study was done individually by the author.37 
 
Measures 
Predictor Variable: Presence of Charismatic Authority Scale (PCA scale) 
Upon completion of the coding process, the fourteen PCA indicators were 
added together to create the predictor variable: The PCA scale.  Since the 
indicators have not been tested for reliability elsewhere, a test-retest 
reliability analysis with an 18-month time lag was conducted by re-coding the 
PCA scores of a random subset of ten groups taken from the study sample.38  
The results of the test-retest reliability analysis indicate an acceptable level of 
correlation (r = 0.781), which suggests that the coding process was reliable.  
In addition, a principle components analysis test (direct oblimin) was 
conducted to ensure internal consistency of the PCA score.  The results of the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (.801) and Bartlett’s test (p < .001) indicated the 
suitability of a principal components analysis.  There are three eigenvalues 
over 1 (8.223, 1.601 and 1.087), however the scree plot indicates strong 
evidence for a single factor solution.  All items aside from 3, 4, and 5, load 
onto the same latent factor.  Cronbach’s alpha for the eleven-item PCA scale is 
.954, which indicates a high level of internal consistency.  As a result, the final 
PCA scale was constructed from eleven of the fourteen indicators (items 1-2, 
6-14).  The mean PCA score for the sample was 21.03 (observed range = 0-50; 
SD = 14.95).  The scale is normally distributed. 
 
Outcome Variables 
The outcome variables chosen for analysis reflect a large range of attack 
outcomes, behaviors, tactics, and operational choices made by terrorist 
groups in the sample, but are constrained by what is available within the 
GTD.  A total of eleven outcome variables were included in the models, and 
can be broadly categorized in two main groups: 1) ‘operational choices’; and 
                                                 
37 For access to the dataset used in this analysis, please contact the author via email. 
38 The test-rest reliability analysis was chosen due to the fact there was only a single coder 
for the PCA scores. Since coding PCA scores for each group was time intensive, it was 
unfeasible to add a second coder for the purposes of inter-rater reliability analyses. In 
order to avoid bias that could distort the results of the second round of coding, research 
for each group was conducted with a “clean slate” approach that did not draw on previous 
notes from the first round of coding. 
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2) ‘attack outcomes’.39 ‘Operational choice’ variables include measures meant 
to identify preferences of tactics, targets, and methods for terrorist attacks.  It 
consists of six variables: 1) suicide attack? (dichotomous yes/no); 2) attack 
type (nominal with 10 categories); 3) target type (nominal with 22 
categories); 4) weapon type (nominal with 13 categories); 5) number of 
perpetrators; and 6) hostage/kidnapping victims? (dichotomous yes/no). 
‘Attack outcomes’ consists of a total of five variables that measure the 
aftermath of each incident: 1) successful attack? (dichotomous yes/no); 2) 
number of victim fatalities; 3) number of perpetrator fatalities; 4) number of 
injured victims; and 5) number of perpetrators injured.  Detailed 
descriptions of each outcome variable and their categories are available 
within the GTD coding handbook.40  A full list of the outcome variables 
chosen for analysis are available in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: List of Outcome Variables 
 
Operational Choices Attack Outcomes 
Suicide Attack? Successful Attack? 
Attack Type Number of Victim Fatalities 
Target Type Number of Perpetrator Fatalities 
Weapon Type Number of Injured Victims 
Number of Perpetrators Number of Perpetrators Injured 
Hostage/Kidnapping Victims?  
 
Control Variables 
For the multivariate models, three additional control variables were included 
to account for differences across geographical regions, time periods, and 
group ideology.  The region control variable consists of thirteen nominal 
categories that divided incidents into large continental and geographical 
regions (South America, Western Europe, South Asia, Central America & 
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Southeast Asia, North America, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and Australia & Oceania).  The decade 
control variable consists of four time periods: The 1970’s, 1980’s, 1990’s, and 
                                                 
39 In order to properly interpret whether or not charismatic forms of leadership influence 
more extreme or aggressive forms of behaviors among their followers, the severity of 
strategies or attacks employed by terrorist groups need to be qualitatively ordered. 
Therefore for the purposes of this study, attack types, targets, and strategies that have a 
higher likelihood of causing personal or bodily harm (e.g., the use of assassination, armed 
assault, bombings/explosions, the targeting of private citizens and police, and so on) are 
treated as more extreme and aggressive forms of behavior than those with a lesser 
likelihood of the same outcome (e.g., hijacking, hostage taking, targeting utilities and 
water supply, and so on). 
40 START, “Global Terrorism Database.” 
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2000-2011.  Lastly, a broadly defined ideology control variable was included 
to account for ideological differences across the sample (ethno-nationalist, 
right-wing, left-wing, and religious).41 
 
Table 4: Attack Incident Frequency across Groups 
 
Group Name Frequency  Group Name Frequency  
Action Directe 48 MILF 186 
Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya 239 ELN 1,081 
Animal Liberation Front 90 New People’s Army 800 
Armed Islamic Group  197 PLO 74 
Army of God 23 Palestinian Islamic Jihad 94 
Baader Meinhof Group 88 PFLP 110 
ETA 1,663 Red Brigades 199 
FMLN 2,098 FARC 1,263 
Hezbollah 163 Shining Path 3,970 
Irish Republican Army 1,587 SLA 4 
Jemaah Islamiya 70 Taliban 1,151 
Jewish Defense League 78 MRTA 516 
PKK 806 Ulster Freedom Fighters 217 
LTTE 973 Ulster Volunteer Force 234 
Lord’s Resistance Army 140 Weathermen 40 
 
Results 
Frequency statistics for attack incidents perpetrated by the study sample are 
available in Table 4.  The descriptive statistics for attack incidents indicate 
that the groups within the study sample committed an average of 606 
terrorist attacks (ranging from 4 to 3,970 attack incidents).  The median value 
is 198 terrorist attacks, and there is a high amount of dispersion (SD = 
858.42). 
 
Descriptive statistics for the five higher-order outcome variables are available 
in Table 5 and provide information on: 1) number of perpetrators; 2) number 
of victim fatalities; 3) number of perpetrator fatalities; 4) number of injured 
victims; and 5) number of perpetrators injured.  The data show that on 
average, terrorist incidents involved around 31 perpetrators (M = 31.26), 
though slightly more than half were committed by groups of five or fewer 
perpetrators (57% of incidents).  The lethality of attacks within the sample 
                                                 
41 The ideological categories were purposefully chosen to be broad (e.g., ‘Religious’ 
instead of ‘Islamist’/ ‘Fundamentalist Christian’, and so on) to account for the relatively 
small sample (n = 30). In case where a certain group could be described with multiple 
ideological categories (e.g., the PKK as ethno-nationalist and leftist), a judgement call was 
made by the coder to choose the primary ideology that best fit the group. 
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appeared to have been relatively low, with an average of close to two victim 
fatalities (M = 1.99) per incident.  The vast majority of attacks (n = 9,521) 
resulted in no victim casualties, and more than 95 percent of attacks claimed 
10 lives or less.  There are similar trends for the number of victims wounded 
(M = 2.72), with 77 percent of attacks (n = 12,121) resulting in no injuries 
among victims, and 96 percent of attacks resulting in ten or fewer injuries.  
Among the perpetrators, there were relatively few fatalities (M = 0.36) and 
injuries (M = 0.05) per incident.  Close to 88 percent of terrorist attacks (n = 
3,200) resulted in no fatalities among the perpetrators, and 97 percent of 
attacks resulted in three fatalities or fewer among the perpetrators.  Findings 
are similar for the number of perpetrators injured, with 98 percent of 
incidents (n = 3,435) indicating no injuries.  
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Higher-Order Outcome Variables 
 
       Mean         SD       
Min 
      Max         n 
Number of Perpetrators 31.26 74.23 0 1,000 2,640 
Number of Victim Fatalities 1.99 7.06 0 375 16,681 
Number of Perpetrator Fatalities 0.36 2.07 0 70 3,665 
Number of Injured Victims 2.72 80.81 0 10,000 16,065 
Number of Perpetrators Injured 0.05 0.49 0 11 3,498 
      
 
 
Table 6: Frequency Statistics for Dichotomous Outcome Variables 
 
         No   Yes     n 
Successful attack? 1,291 16,880 18,171 
Suicide attack? 17,905 267 18,172 
Hostages or Kidnapping? 16,574 1,579 18,153 
    
 
 
Table 6 displays the frequency statistics for the three dichotomous variables: 
1) successful attack?; 2) suicide attack?; and 3) hostages or kidnapping 
victims? Nearly 93 percent of attack incidents were deemed successful (n = 
16,880), and less than two percent of attacks involved suicide tactics (n = 
267).  Lastly, approximately nine percent of incidents (n = 1,579) involved 
kidnapping or hostage taking. 
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Table 7: Frequency statistics for Attack Type, Weapon Type, Target Type, Region, Decade and 
Ideology  
 
     
 Frequency 
  
    %   
  
Frequen
cy 
 
 % 
      
Attack Type:   Target Type:   
Bombing/Explosion 8,169 45.0 Private Citizens/Property 3,781 20.8 
Armed Assault 3,857 21.2 Business 3,604 19.8 
Assassination 3,037 16.7 Police 2,549 14.0 
Facility/Infrastructure 1,298 7.1 Government (General) 2,427 13.4 
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping) 1,094 6.0 Utilities 2,023 11.1 
Other/Unknown 450 2.5 Non-Aviation Transport 1,006 5.5 
Hostage Taking (Barricade) 197 1.1 Military 510 2.8 
Hijacking 46 0.3 Educational Institutions 376 2.1 
Unarmed Assault 24 0.1 Journalists/Media 332 1.8 
   Government (Diplomatic) 284 1.6 
Region:   Religious figures/locales 248 1.4 
South America 6,829 37.6 Other 225 1.2 
Western Europe 4,231 23.3 Telecommunication 173 1.0 
South Asia 2,124 11.7 Airports and Airlines 127 0.7 
Central America & Caribbean 2,099 11.6 Unknown 101 0.6 
Middle East and North Africa 1,474 8.1 Other Terrorists 101 0.6 
Southeast Asia 1,055 5.8 NGOs 70 0.4 
North America 209 1.2 Tourists 65 0.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 146 0.8 Food/Water Supply 56 0.3 
Eastern Europe 4 0.0 Violent Political Parties 47 0.3 
Australia and Oceania 1 0.0 Maritime Transportation 45 0.2 
   Abortion Related 22 0.1 
Decade:      
1970-1979 (1970s) 1,676 9.2 Weapon Type:   
1980-1989 (1980s) 7,956 43.8 Explosives/Bombs/TNT 8,284 45.6 
1990-1999 (1990s) 5,423 29.8 Firearms 6,635 36.5 
2001-2011 (2000 onwards) 3,117 17.2 Other/Unknown 1,610 8.9 
   Incendiary 1,401 7.7 
Ideology:   Melee 204 1.1 
Left-wing 10,196 56.1 Chemical 16 0.1 
Ethno-nationalist 5,634 31.0 Sabotage Equipment 9 0.1 
Religious 2,341 12.9 Vehicle 4 0.0 
Right-wing 0 0.0 Fake Weapons 1 0.0 
      
      
n = 18,172 
 
Frequency statistics for the three multi-category nominal variables (attack 
type, target type, weapon type) and the three control variables (region, 
decade, ideology) in Table 7 reveal a number of trends in regard to strategic 
choices made by the study sample. The preferred method of attack was the 
use of bombs/explosives (n = 8,169), with 45 percent of incidents involving 
some form of explosive device.  The other two favored methods of attack were 
armed assault (n = 3,857, 21.2%) and assassination (n = 3,037, 16.7%).  The 
favored target was private property and citizens (n = 3,781, 20.8%), followed 
by businesses (n = 3,604, 19.8%), police targets (n = 2,549, 14%), and general 
government targets (n = 2,427, 13.4%).  The weapon of choice for terrorist 
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groups within the sample was explosives/bombs/TNT (n = 8,284), with 45.6 
percent of terrorist incidents involving explosives as the primary weapon.  
The next most frequent weapons of choice were firearms (n = 6,635, 36.5%), 
other/unknown weapons (n = 1,610, 8.9%), and incendiary weapons (n = 
1,401, 7.7%).  There were no recorded terrorist events using biological, 
radiological, or nuclear weapons within the study sample.  Frequency 
statistics for the decade, region, and ideology control variables reveal that the 
majority of attack incidents occurred in the 1980s (n = 7,956, 43.8%) and 
1990s (n = 5,423, 29.8%), took place mostly in South America (n = 6,829, 
37.6%) and Western Europe (n = 4,231, 23.3%), and primarily involved 
groups with left-wing (n = 10,196, 56.1%) and ethno-nationalist ideologies (n 
= 5,634, 31%). 
 
For the purposes of the bivariate and multivariate analyses, categories with 
relatively low frequencies were recoded into their respective ‘other’ categories.  
For attack type, this included hijacking (n = 46, 0.3%) and unarmed assault 
(n = 24, 0.1%).  For target type, the threshold for recoding was categories 
with less than 100 cases (NGOs, tourists, food and water supply, violent 
political parties, maritime ports and facilities, abortion related).  In weapon 
type, the recoded categories included chemical weapons (n = 16, 0.1%), fake 
weapons (n = 1, 0.0%), vehicles (n = 4, 0.0%), and sabotage attacks (n = 9, 
0.1%).  
 
Table 8: Results of Spearman’s correlation (survey-based variance estimates) – PCA scores 
by outcome variables 
 
       Spearman’s 
rho 
        Sig.          N 
Number of Victim Fatalities                   0.317**         0.006 16,681 
Number of Perpetrator Fatalities                   0.239            0.746  3,665 
Number of Victims Injured 0.258 0.304      15,814 
Number of Perpetrators Injured 0.017 0.166      3,498 
Number of Perpetrators -0.258 0.591      2,640 
* p <.001  ** p < .05  + p <.10    
 
 
In order to understand how the PCA scores varied according to each of the 
five higher-order outcome variables at the bivariate level, Spearman 
correlations (employing survey-based variance estimates to account for the 
clustered data) were examined.  Results are available in Table 8, and show 
that the only significant relationship is number of victim fatalities (rho = 
0.317, p < .05).  This suggests that higher number of victim fatalities involved 
in terrorist events is positively correlated with higher levels of the PCA. 
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Table 9: Results of ANOVA and t-tests (survey-based variance estimates) - PCA scores by 
outcome variables 
 
     
 
Mean 
  
  
LSE   
  
Mean 
 
 LSE 
Attack Typea** (F = 50.60)   Target Typea* (F = 100.86)   
Assassination 21.88 5.75 Business 19.00 5.49 
Armed Assault 26.52 5.41 Government (General) 26.28 5.44 
Bombing/Explosion 22.09 6.45 Police 25.29 4.96 
Hostage Taking (Barricade) 16.41 5.81 Military 23.40 6.06 
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping) 24.14 4.21 Airports and Airlines 24.80 4.06 
Facility/Infrastructure Attack 20.02 5.61 Government (Diplomatic) 26.81 4.10 
Other/Unknown 29.44 4.10 Educational Institutions 31.67 4.20 
   Journalists and Media 19.43 5.69 
Weapon Typea (F = 0.48)   Other 28.44 4.13 
Firearms 24.01 5.36 Private Citizens and Property 25.16 5.18 
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 22.15 6.26 Religious Figures / Locales 31.06 3.28 
Incendiary 18.69 5.31 Telecommunication 18.95 7.76 
Melee 32.61 3.90 Other Terrorist Groups 17.47 5.98 
Other 26.99 3.81 Non-Aviation Transportation 24.06 5.95 
   Unknown 23.77 5.29 
   Utilities 16.24 10.23 
      
Successful Attack?b* (t = 8.33)   Suicide Attack?b* (t = 15.49)   
No 19.39 5.05 No 22.89 5.55 
Yes 23.40 5.58 Yes 38.61 2.95 
      
Hostage/Kidnapping?b** 
(t = 2.40) 
     
No 23.02 5.69    
Yes 23.96 4.45    
      
* p <.001  ** p < .05  + p <.10 
a ANOVA      b t-test    
LSE = Linearized Standard Error 
 
The results of ANOVA tests (employing survey-based variance estimates) to 
compare the differences in means of the PCA scores across the three multi-
categorical nominal variables (attack type, weapon type, and target type) are 
available in Table 9.  Attack type (F = 50.60, p < .001) and target type (F = 
100.86, p < .05) are significant, and suggest that certain types of strategies 
were employed in relation to higher PCA scores within the sample.  In regard 
to attack type, terrorist events with higher than average levels of the PCA 
favored ‘other’ weapons (M = 29.44), armed assault (M = 26.52), and 
kidnapping (M = 24.14).  Post hoc analyses using the Scheffé criterion for 
significance indicate that for attack type, the average number of errors was 
significantly lower in the bombings/explosions (M = -5.47) and 
facility/infrastructure (M = -1.85) conditions than in the remaining 
conditions (M = 0.21 to 7.56).  For target type, terrorist events that exhibited 
relative higher average levels of the PCA favored attack targets such as 
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educational institutions (M = 31.67), religious figures / locales (M = 31.06), 
other targets than those listed (M = 28.44), and both general (M = 26.28) and 
diplomatic (M = 26.81) government targets.  Scheffé post hoc analysis results 
for target type indicate that the average number of errors was lower in the 
utilities (M = -0.04) and telecommunications (M = 0.43) conditions than in 
the remaining conditions (M = 4.41 to 9.45).  At the bivariate level, weapon 
type was found to be non-significant (F = 1.86, p > .05), which suggests that 
differing levels of PCA had no effect on the choice of weapons within the study 
sample. 
 
In order to compare differences across means, t-tests (employing survey-
based variance estimates) were conducted for the remaining three 
dichotomous variables (successful attack? suicide attack? and 
hostages/kidnapping?).  Results of the t-tests in Table 9 show that all three 
relationships are significant (p < .05).  Terrorist events that had higher 
relative PCA scores tended to be more successful (‘No’ mean = 19.39 / ‘Yes’ 
mean = 23.40, p < .001).  Unsurprisingly, terrorist groups that have higher 
relative levels of the PCA were much more likely to engage in suicide attacks 
(‘No’ mean = 22.89 / ‘Yes’ mean = 38.61, p < .001).  Lastly, there is not much 
difference in the means for the hostages/kidnapping? variable (‘No’ mean = 
23.02 / ‘Yes’ mean = 23.96, p < .05), suggesting that while the relationship is 
significant, the presence of charismatic authority did not greatly affect 
whether or not the groups engaged in hostage or kidnapping events.  
 
Table 10: Multi-level linear and logistic model regression results – centered PCA scores 
predicting outcome variables 
 
       b       SE  SD        b   SE   OR  ICC 
Higher-Order Variables:a    Dichotomous Variables:b     
Number of Victim Fatalities 0.052 0.993 2.349 Successful Attack? 2.334* 0.378 1.014 0.040 
Number of Victims Injured 0.682 0.076 1.450 Suicide Attack? 0.005 0.036 1.004 0.117 
Number of Perpetrator Fatalities 0.086 0.310 1.670 Hostages/Kidnapping? -0.047* 0.022 0.954 0.066 
Number of Perpetrators Injured 0.009 0.083 1.866      
Number of Perpetrators 2.119 13.452 8.281      
 * p <.001  ** p < .05  + p <.10 
a Multi-level linear regression, controlling for region, ideology and decade. Coefficient for the PCA predictor variable is displayed. 
b Multi-level logistic regression, controlling for region, ideology and decade. Coefficient for the PCA predictor variable is displayed. 
ICC = Intraclass correlation coefficient 
 
At the multivariate level, separate random-intercept multilevel models that 
controlled for decade, region, and ideology were run for each of the outcome 
variables (using a group mean centered version of the PCA scale) to account 
for the direction of model predictions and the hierarchical nature of the data.  
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Each multi-level model was tested for the inclusion of the regression 
coefficient to verify if using a random-effects model was justified.  When 
controlling for region, ideology, and decade, the multi-level linear regression 
results for the five higher-order variables available in Table 10 indicate that 
none are significant at the multivariate level (p > .05), suggesting that PCA 
scores are not related to the number of perpetrators involved in terrorist 
events, nor with the number of victim and perpetrator fatalities and injuries.  
Multi-level logistic regression models run for each of the dichotomous 
variables (success, suicide, and hostages/kidnapping) that controlled for 
region, ideology, and decade indicate that while all three variables are 
significant at the bivariate level, only successful attack (b = 2.334, OR 1.014, p 
< .001) and hostages/kidnapping (b = -0.047, OR = 0.954, p < .001) remain 
significant at the multivariate level.  The results indicate that terrorist events 
with higher levels of the PCA had a slightly lesser likelihood of employing 
hostage and kidnapping tactics, and a slightly greater likelihood of success. 
 
Table 11: Multinomial logit model regression results – centered PCA scores predicting 
outcome variables 
 
       b       SE  OR        b   SE   OR 
Attack Type:a    Target Type:a    
(Reference: Bombing/Explosion)    (Reference: Private Citizen)    
Assassination 0.010* 0.015 1.010 Business -0.021* 0.002 0.979 
Armed Assault 0.015* 0.001 1.015 Government (General) -0.000 0.002 1.000 
Hostage Taking (Barricade) -0.021* 0.005 0.979 Police 0.001 0.002 1.001 
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping) 0.001 0.002 1.001 Military -0.010** 0.003 0.990 
Facility/Infrastructure Attack -0.009* 0.002 0.991 Airports and Airlines 0.007 0.006 1.007 
Other/Unknown 0.034* 0.003 1.034 Government (Diplomatic) 0.018** 0.004 1.009 
    Educational Institutions 0.018* 0.004 1.018 
Weapon Type:a    Journalists and Media -0.026* 0.004 0.974 
(Reference: Bombs/TNT)    Other 0.009** 0.003 1.009 
Firearms 0.011 0.007 1.011 Religious Figures / Locales 0.011** 0.005 1.011 
Incendiary -0.013 0.014 0.987 Telecommunication -0.027* 0.005 0.973 
Melee 0.415** 0.016 1.042 Other Terrorist Groups -0.021** 0.007 0.979 
Other 0.020 0.014 1.020 Non-Aviation Transport. -0.008* 0.002 0.992 
    Unknown -0.009 0.007 0.992 
    Utilities -0.030* 0.002 0.971 
* p <.001  ** p < .05  + p <.10 
a Multinominal logit, controlling for region, ideology and decade. Coefficient for the PCA predictor variable is displayed. 
 
Results are available in Table 11 for two-level multinomial logit models that 
were run for the three multi-categorical nominal variables (attack type, 
target type and weapon type), controlling for region, ideology, and decade.  
For attack type, using ‘bombing/explosions’ as the reference category, 
assassination (b = 0.010, OR = 1.010, p < .001), armed assault (b= 0.015, OR 
= 1.015, p < .001), hostage taking (barricade) (b = -0.021, OR = 0.979, p < 
.001), facility/infrastructure attack (b = -0.009, OR = 0.991, p < .001), and 
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other/unknown (b = 0.034, OR = 1.034, p < .001) are significant.  This 
suggests that terrorist events within the study sample with higher PCA scores 
were more likely to use assassination, armed assault and ‘other’ attack types 
(aside from the other categories listed) than bombs, and less likely to use 
barricading and facility/infrastructure attacks than bombs.  Using ‘private 
citizens and property’ as the reference category for target type, businesses (b 
= -0.021, OR = 0.979, p < .001), military (b = -0.010, OR = 0.990, p < .05), 
diplomatic government targets (b = 0.018, OR = 1.009, p < .05), educational 
institutions (b = 0.018, OR = 1.018, p < .001), journalists and media (b = -
0.026, OR = 0.974, p < .001), other targets (b = 0.009, OR = 1.009, p < .05), 
religious figures and locales (b = 0.011, OR = 1.011, p < .05), 
telecommunication (b = -0.027, OR = 0.973, p < .001), other terrorist groups 
(b = -0.021, OR = 0.979, p < .05), non-aviation transportation (b = -0.008, 
OR = 0.992, p < .001), and utilities (b = -0.030, OR = 0.971, p < .001) are 
significant.  This indicates that terrorist events with higher PCA scores were 
more likely to target private citizens and property than businesses, military, 
journalists/media, telecommunication, other terrorist groups, non-aviation 
transportation, and utilities, and were more likely to target diplomatic 
government targets, ‘other’ targets than those listed, and religious 
figures/locales than private citizens and property.  Lastly, for weapon type, 
higher levels of the PCA predicted a preference for melee weapons (b = 0.415, 
OR = 1.042, p < .05) over bombs, explosives, or dynamite. 
 
Discussion 
This study was conducted to examine the relationship between differing levels 
of charismatic authority and their strategic and operational choices within a 
sample of terrorist organizations.  Although more research is required before 
any of the current findings can be treated as authoritative, the results reveal 
several discernable operational trends.  Findings at the bivariate level suggest 
that terrorist groups with a higher magnitude of charismatic authority 
committed more lethal attacks.  However, this finding is not supported at the 
multivariate level when controlling for region, decade, and ideology.  
Multivariate findings on attack and weapon types indicate that the terrorist 
groups within the sample with higher levels of charismatic authority were 
more likely to employ melee weapons, use assassination tactics, engage in 
armed assault, and use ‘other’ attack types, over bombs and explosives.  
However, in regard to weapon choice, groups with higher levels of charismatic 
authority were more likely to employ bombs and explosives over barricade 
incidents and facility/infrastructure attacks.  In terms of target preferences, 
results indicate that groups with higher levels of charismatic authority were 
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more likely to attack diplomatic targets, educational institutions, ‘other’ 
targets, and religious figures/locales than private citizens and property, but 
were more likely to target private citizens and property rather than business, 
military targets, journalists and media, telecommunications, other terrorist 
groups, non-aviation transportation, and utilities.  However, most of the 
significant multivariate findings are limited in their predictive utility.  The 
likelihood of all of these relationships are relatively low (< 5%), which 
suggests that they are not particularly helpful in authoritatively anticipating 
the strategic behaviors of charismatically-led terrorist groups.  
 
Despite the seminal nature of the current study, there are a number of 
conclusions that may help inform future empirical analyses of charismatic 
terrorist leadership.  To begin, findings at both the bivariate and multivariate 
levels indicate that highly-charismatic groups within the sample tended to be 
more successful in their attacks.  This suggests that the presence of strong 
charismatic authority may have some form of operational or strategic benefit 
to terrorist groups.  The broader literature on leadership in both peaceful and 
violent movements note that effective leadership is a crucial component to 
organizational success.42  However, how charismatic leaders influence the 
success or failure of terrorist attacks cannot be determined definitively with 
the current data.   
 
While speculative, one way in which charismatic terrorist leaders may 
contribute to organizational success is by promoting group cohesion and self-
identification with the terrorist organization and its cause.43  This observation 
is supported by study results that indicate a preference for “face-to-face” 
weapon and attack types (e.g., assassination, armed assault, and melee 
weapons) over the use of bombs and explosives within charismatically-led 
terrorist groups.  Research on interpersonal violence and conflict has shown 
that people have an innate resistance to killing,44 although this can be broken 
                                                 
42 Bass, Bernard and Ruth Bass, The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, 
and Managerial Applications (New York: The Free Press, 2009), 11; Bernard Bass, Bruce 
Avolio, Dong Jung, and Yair Berson, “Predicting Unit Performance by Assessing 
Transformational and Transactional Leadership,” Journal of applied Psychology 88: 2 
(2003): 209-209; Dawson, “The Study of New Religious Movements,” 14; McAdam, 
Douglas, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 47. 
43 See Boas Shamir, Michael Arthur, and Robert House, “The Rhetoric of Charismatic 
Leadership: A Theoretical Extension, a Case Study, and Implications for Research,” 
Leadership Quarterly 5: 1 (1994): 27-29. 
44 Grossman, David, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and 
Society (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009). 
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down through conditioning or moral disengagement45 or the use of 
impersonal weaponry such as guns and drone strikes.46  For the average 
person, then, killing someone at close proximity or with his or her bare hands 
requires a great deal of psychological conditioning and unwavering 
commitment to a leader, group, or cause.  The establishment of a strong 
charismatic bond may strengthen both individual commitment and group 
cohesion as followers conflate their needs and identity with that of the leader 
and his or her cause.47  This, in turn, may help followers overcome social and 
psychological barriers to close-hand interpersonal violence.  This is perhaps 
best exemplified by ISIS’s commonplace use of knives and swords to behead 
those they deem to be infidels.  The preference for hand-to-hand attack 
methods therefore supports the idea that strong forms of charismatic 
authority within the study sample may play an important role in catalysing 
group cohesion and the intense socialization required to overcome the 
aversion to kill.  If this finding is substantiated in future research, it has the 
potential to help inform the ongoing debate over the effectiveness of 
leadership decapitation.   
 
There are evident operational benefits for terrorist groups that function with 
high levels of cohesion: A heightened sense of purpose, a strong support 
system, resilience against outside infiltration, etc.  But there are also 
weaknesses.  If charismatic terrorist leaders are indeed central to fostering 
group cohesion and identity, leadership decapitation strategies may prove 
more effective at disrupting these types of terrorist organizations.48  This may 
also help explain why leadership decapitation is effective against some 
groups, but not others.49  Needless to say, this supposition requires more 
research in order to be treated as conclusive.  However, given the importance 
of highly-charismatic leaders to multiple aspects of their movements, it is 
surprising that none of the literature for or against the effectiveness of 
                                                 
45 Albert Bandura, “The Role of Selection Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism,” in F.M. Moghaddam and A.J. Marsella (eds.), Understanding 
Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences and Interventions (Washington: 
American Psychological Association Press, 2004). 
46 Neta Bar and Eyal Ben-Ari, “Israeli Snipers in the Al-Aqsa Intifada: Killing, Humanity 
and Lived Experience,” Third World Quarterly 26: 1 (2005); Moghaddam, “A Staircase to 
Terrorism,” 166. 
47 Dawson, “Crises of Charismatic Legitimacy,” 84. 
48 Cronin, Audrey K., How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of 
Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 26; Weber, On 
Charisma and Institution Building, 246-249. 
49 See Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 14; Michael Freeman, “A Theory of Terrorist 
Leadership and its Consequences for Leadership Targeting),” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 26 (2014): 666-687; Richardson, What Terrorists Want, xx-xxi. 
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leadership decapitation strategies has adequately integrated the social-
scientific concept of charismatic authority into their analyses.50 
 
The appearance of success is a crucial component in charismatic leaders’ 
ability to maintain the charismatic bond with their followers.  Since the basis 
for their authority lies in the perceptions of their followers, charismatic 
leaders must continually prove their legitimacy through successful 
endeavours or risk losing their authority.51  It is therefore unsurprising that 
charismatic groups within the sample were more likely to be successful, given 
that the vast majority of the examined groups consist of long-lived terrorist 
organizations.  In other words, a certain measure of success was required for 
the highly-charismatic groups within the sample to persist, or followers would 
have abandoned the leaders’ causes.  This, however, suggests that limiting 
and minimizing opportunities for charismatically-led terrorist groups to claim 
“successes” may be pivotal in delegitimizing their leadership by rendering 
them impotent in the eyes of their followers.52  In particular, delegitimizing 
charismatic leaders may have a significant role in hampering their ability to 
radicalize potential members.   
 
As the existing literature on terrorist radicalization indicates, the appearance 
of legitimacy is an important factor in the ability of a leader to attract new 
recruits.53  Simply killing or incarcerating a charismatic terrorist leader may 
only serve to enhance or even routinize their charismatic authority by 
entrenching them as symbols or martyrs to the cause.54  Similarly, 
government responses that aim for swift apprehension of culprits and that 
publically downplay the magnitude of terror attacks may be beneficial to 
building resilience among civilians, but ignore the benefits accrued by 
charismatic-leaders who are seen as capable of executing successful terrorist 
attacks.  Therefore, government responses to terrorism could benefit from 
efforts to mitigate and control perceptions of success among terrorist groups 
and their larger support networks.  Detection and denial will always remain 
                                                 
50 Hofmann and Dawson, “The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority,” 362. 
51 Dawson, “Crises of Charismatic Legitimacy,” 94-98; Weber, On Charisma and 
Institution Building, 22-23; Wilson, The Noble Savages, 29-31. 
52 See Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley, “How Terrorist Groups Decline,” ITAC: 
Trends in Terrorism (2007): 8-9, available at: http://www.itac.gc.ca/pblctns/pdf/2007-
1-eng.pdf. 
53 Neumann, Peter R., Old & New Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 102; Richardson, 
What Terrorists Want, 45; Wiktorowicz, Quintain, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim 
Extremism in the West (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 25-26, 127, 147. 
54 Hutchinson and O’Malley, “How Terrorist Groups Decline,” 9; Crenshaw, Martha, 
Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences (London: Routledge, 2011), 
93. 
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the primary tools in preventing terrorist successes.  However, if the 
appearance of success is indeed a cornerstone in maintaining charismatic 
authority within terrorist groups, then nuanced and carefully tested counter-
terrorism and media strategies that attack perceptions of success may have an 
effect in hampering efforts to recruit new members and the ability of 
charismatic leaders to maintain authority over their followers. 
 
Study findings are also supportive of the existence of separate roles for 
charismatic and operational leaders within terrorist groups.  The limited 
influence of charismatic authority on attack outcomes (e.g., the number of 
perpetrators, fatalities, and wounded) and the limited predictive utility of the 
findings on strategic choices may indicate that operational decisions within 
terrorist groups are made separately from concerns involving charismatic 
authority.  In simpler terms, research results suggest that charismatic leaders 
may be more concerned with maintaining their authority than worrying about 
the small details involved in planning and executing terrorist attacks.  In 
social movement theory, this division of movement leadership has been 
analyzed and substantiated with empirical case studies.55  In the particular 
case of contentious social movements, two different types of leadership have 
been identified: Task oriented (operational) leaders, who focus on assembling 
resources and executing group action, and people-oriented (charismatic) 
leaders, who focus on evoking and framing emotional responses within the 
group.56  Interestingly, theorists note that conflict and imbalance between 
task and people-oriented leaders is a significant factor in the failure of 
contentious social movements.57  If a similar division in leadership roles is 
common among terrorist groups, as hinted at by the current research 
findings, then further empirical research aimed at differentiating the exact 
roles and breadth of the influence of charismatic and operational terrorist 
leaders is needed.  This may lead to the identification of potential sources of 
tension between operational and charismatic leaders that may help in crafting 
non-coercive counter-terrorism initiatives aimed at delegitimizing terrorist 
leadership or destabilizing larger terrorist networks. 
 
                                                 
55 Ronald Aminzade, Jack Goldstone, Doug McAdam, and Elizabeth Perry, “Leadership 
Dynamics and the Dynamics of Contention,” in Ronald Aminzade, Jack Goldstone, Doug 
McAdam, Elizabeth Perry, William Sewell, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (eds.), 
Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 126-154; Aldon Morris and Suzanne Staggenborg, “Leadership in Social 
Movements,” in D.A Snow, S.A. Soule and H. Kriesi (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to 
Social Movements (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 171-172. 
56 Aminzade et. al., “Leadership Dynamics and the Dynamics of Contention,” 129-132. 
57 Ibid., 141-142; Bryan C. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation 
Contributes to Counterterrorism,” International Security 36 (2012): 44. 
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Study Limitations 
Research results should be interpreted with a number of limitations in mind.  
Study findings only begin to shed light on a small portion of the complex 
realities involved in charismatic relationships within terrorist groups.  Study 
results cannot account for any meso or micro level social processes that may 
influence the strategic and ideological direction of groups.  The data available 
in the GTD are insufficient for measuring group-level motivations, 
relationships and social realities.  This necessitates employing the PCA 
indicators in qualitative research that can examine these group-level social 
processes in more depth, or undertaking quantitative survey research among 
active or incarcerated terrorists and radicals that inquires about charismatic 
relationships.58 
 
An additional study limitation is the inability to measure the influence of 
multiple levels of leadership and authority on operational tactics and results 
of attack incidents.  Leadership manifests at many different levels within both 
violent and non-violent social movements.59  This research focuses exclusively 
upon charismatic organizational-level terrorist leaders–the top leaders–and 
therefore fails to account for the effect of mid-level (e.g., lieutenants, network 
brokers, seconds-in-command), cell-level, and grassroots leaders. F uture 
research designs that can account for the effects of multiple levels of 
leadership are needed to flesh out the full range of the influence of 
charismatic authority in terrorist groups.  With proper data, social network 
analyses can be extremely beneficial in understanding the multi-level 
complexity involved in the construction and maintenance of charismatic 
authority and leadership within terrorist groups. 
 
A number of study limitations are also the result of the coding process used to 
determine the PCA scores for the study sample.  Much like the GTD, the 
coding process overwhelmingly relied on secondary source data.  As a result, 
coding was done from an “outsider” perspective, and was limited in its ability 
to gain a truly deep understanding of the processes of charismatic authority 
within the sample groups.  The coding process was also hampered by barriers 
involving language and access to information.  This led to certain groups 
being discarded entirely from the sample, which means that true probability 
sampling is impossible.  As a result, generalizability of research findings 
                                                 
58 See Schbley and McCauley, “Political, Religious, and Psychological Characteristics of 
Muslim Protest Marchers in Eight European Cities,” 559-560. 
59 Barker, Colin, Alan Johnson, and Michael Lavalette, Leadership and Social Movements 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 15; Morris and Staggenborg, 
“Leadership in Social Movements,” 190. 
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beyond the study sample is impossible.  Lastly, since there was only a single 
coder for the PCA scores for each group within the sample, there was 
admittedly an element of subjectivity in the coding of the predictor variable.  
Methods involving rigorous gathering and triangulation of data, along with 
clearly outlined coding protocols that were consistently applied across each 
group were employed to mitigate elements of subjective coding as much as 
possible.  However, despite efforts to limit elements of subjectivity during the 
coding process, it is impossible to completely eliminate it from the analysis.  
This limitation should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
 
The unique security situation surrounding terrorism studies makes gaining 
access to primary source data difficult at times.  As a direct result, databases 
like the GTD rely almost exclusively on secondary source data, which limits 
information to the details known by the public.  The inability to 
comprehensively measure the “true” number and characteristics of terrorist 
attacks can lead to unidentifiable statistical deformations that may cause 
incorrect or incomplete findings.  This problem is further exacerbated by the 
study’s use of cross-sectional data to examine a dynamic phenomenon like 
charismatic authority.  Complex social phenomena like leadership and 
authority are ever changing relationships that are renewed and recreated 
through repeated interactions between leaders and followers.  This raises an 
issue with some of the longer-lived terrorist organizations in the sample, 
whose ideology, actions, and leadership can change in a variety of different 
ways throughout their life course.  An inclusion criteria limiting attack 
incidents to those that overlapped with the active time-period of the “major” 
charismatic leader used for coding was originally considered during sampling, 
but was ultimately decided against.  A charismatic leader’s “presence” can be 
routinized and persist after his or her death or incapacitation, much like how 
Osama Bin Laden’s charisma persists in al-Qaeda inspired terrorism.  
However, the fashion in which charismatic authority routinizes is not 
universal across all terrorist groups, and the use of a cross-sectional predictor 
variable in this study is admittedly problematic.  Keeping this limitation in 
mind, longitudinal statistical analyses of long-lived terrorist groups which 
correlate strategic and behavioral trends with the rise and fall of charismatic 
leaders across the organizational lifespan may prove to be useful to future 
quantitative research on charismatic authority in terrorist groups. 
 
Conclusion 
The study of how charismatic forms of authority influence the strategic and 
operational dynamics in terrorist groups is in its infancy, and many aspects of 
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charismatic terrorist leadership remain unexamined or under-developed.  For 
example, how do mid or lower level leaders influence the strategic operation 
of terrorist groups?  Are there other forms of charismatic authority than those 
examined in the study, such as the attribution and development of the 
charismatic bond through the Internet and social media?  How does 
charismatic authority actively contribute to the radicalization and recruitment 
of terrorists?  Does the coercive removal of charismatic leaders have a greater 
contribution to the disruption or dissolution of their groups?  Is there an 
effective way to delegitimize charismatic forms of leadership within terrorist 
groups?  Findings from the current study are promising, but only scratch the 
surface of a highly complex social relationship.  Knowledge of how 
charismatic terrorist leaders recruit, radicalize, and manage their 
organizations may prove to be pivotal in crafting effective counter-terrorism 
strategies aimed at disrupting or dissolving these types of groups.  But, this 
will require much more empirical research that employs a variety of different 
methodological approaches before we can gain a truly holistic understanding 
of the nuances involved in the establishment, maintenance, and ultimate 
demise of charismatic terrorist leadership. 
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